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Abstract
We examine a protocol πbeacon that outputs unpredictable and publicly verifiable ran-
domness, meaning that the output is unknown at the time that πbeacon starts, yet everyone
can verify that the output is close to uniform after πbeacon terminates. We show that πbeacon
can be instantiated via Bitcoin under sensible assumptions; in particular we consider an
adversary with an arbitrarily large initial budget who may not operate at a loss indefinitely.
In case the adversary has an infinite budget, we provide an impossibility result that stems
from the similarity between the Bitcoin model and Santha-Vazirani sources. We also give a
hybrid protocol that combines trusted parties and a Bitcoin-based beacon.
1 Introduction
Consider multiple parties who wish to execute a high stake protocol that involves public random-
ness. For example, the parties may wish to elect one of them as a leader, in a way that allows
anyone (including non-participants in the protocol) to verify that the elected leader did not
corrupt the election process by offering bribes to other parties. If the source of the randomness
can be tampered with, corrupt parties may try to influence this source in their favor. Due to
the high stakes, rational parties may also try to influence the randomness source, even if it is
costly to them in the case that they fail.
A reliable source of publicly-verifiable randomness is useful as a basis for many cryptographic
primitives. For instance, the design of the SHA256 hash function specifies operations such as
y ← (x rotr 6)⊕(x rotr 11)⊕(x rotr 25), where rotr is a circular shift right instruction. Moreover,
SHA256 specifies some particular 2048 bits for round constants, as well as some particular 256 bits
for an initial state. To increase the public confidence in the scheme, these 2048+256 = 2304 bits
were derived by invoking simple functions on a series of small prime numbers, since the SHA256
designers claim that other choices for these 2304 bits would be just as good. Still, there exists
the possibility that SHA256 has a backdoor (cf. [13]) that was conjured by first picking the 2304
bits for the round constants and the initial state, and then computing constants for the SHA256
algorithm (such as 6, 11, 25 above) that enable the backdoor. It is of course possible to outsource
the selection of these 2304 bits to a trusted party, but the question of how to publicly verify that
the SHA256 designers and the trusted party did not collude remains unanswered. If the SHA256
designers could publish the algorithm and define the 2304 bits to be the unpreditable bits that
a public beacon has yet to produce, the confidence in SHA256 might be even higher.
To take a more rigorous example, one may consider a provably secure (albeit less efficient)
algebraic hash function of the form H(x, y) = gxhy. Finding a collision H(x1, y1) = H(x2, y2)
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is equivalent to breaking a discrete-log hardness assumption (cf. [39] and [50, Lecture 4]). For
this to hold, g and h should be selected as random elements, i.e., without knowing a number n
such that gn = h. In groups that are of interest it is easy to sample random elements by tossing
public coins (see for example [5, Section 3.3.4]), and hence the unpreditable bits that a public
beacon produces can be used to define the element h.
On the other hand, a public beacon is unhelpful in the case of cryptographic primitives that
rely on a structured common reference string (CRS), because private randomness is needed in
order to produce the secrets that the structured CRS is comprised of (cf. [28, 8]). Thus, for
a protocol that requires a CRS of the form, say, s = (gx, gy, gxy), a trusted party can use her
private randomness to sample x, y and compute s, while a public beacon can sample gx, gy but
will not be able to output s (if computational Diffie-Hellman [23, 15] is intractable). To give some
concrete examples, the Zerocash cryptocurrency [18] and other constructions that are based on
linear PCPs [31, 14] cannot utilize a public beacon. Many other NIZK constructions require a
structured CRS, for example [29]. Protocols that sample a structured CRS (e.g., [10]) are not
publicly verifiable, and may become increasingly susceptible to aborts (a.k.a. denial of service)
in conjunction with the number of parties that execute the sampling algorithm. Additionally,
let us remark that when the stakes are high the standard definitions do not necessarily capture
a real-world setting. For instance, consider n parties that execute n or fewer invocations of a
protocol with identifiable aborts [32], until an invocation terminates with no aborts by any of
the remaining parties. If at least one party is honest then she always contributes her input
(i.e., private randomness) to the structured CRS and then destroys her input. However, a single
party who remains alone in the final invocation is then more likely to become corrupt (e.g., she
could be pressured by the other corrupt parties, or she might be willing to be bribed).
A good randomness source can be useful for an individual user too. Since it is difficult to
operate in a completely secure environment, the personal computer of a user could be infected
with malware. If the user wishes to run a sensitive process that depends on randomness, she
may be concerned about the possibility that malware would interact with this process and feed
it non-random bits. Hence, if the process can run a verification algorithm that ensures that
the bits originated from a reliable randomness source, the prospects of a successful attack are
diminished.
One possible method for obtaining unpreditable random bits is to use financial data [19].
For example, we can derive the output from the least significant bits (LSBs) of the end-of-day
price of some particular assets that are traded on a stock exchange. However, it is problematic
to formalize the assumptions and quantify the security that this protocol achieves. If the stakes
are high enough then it might for example be possible to bribe a person who controls the display
of the stock prices, so that she would tweak the LSBs of the end-of-day price of the particular
assets. Furthermore, attempting to amplify the security of this protocol is nontrivial: if we wish
to derive the beacon output from two distant stock exchanges (say NYSE and SEHK), then a
person who controls the display in one stock exchange can wait and see the prices of the other
exchange, and then modify the LSBs in the stock exchange that she controls accordingly.
An alternative approach is the NIST beacon [1, 43], though it relies on a trusted party.
In this work we explore whether the Bitcoin model [41, 27] is a reliable source of public
randomness. Clearly, in the absence of an attacker, the entropy that is used to generate fresh
secret keys and the assumption that the Proof of Work hash resembles a random oracle imply
that plenty of random bits can be extracted from the Bitcoin ledger. In the presence of an
attacker, our results can be summarized as follows:
1. If the attacker has p fraction of the Bitcoin mining power and she is able to generate
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Bitcoin blocks at a loss, indefinitely, then it is impossible to extract from the Bitcoin
ledger a single bit whose statistical distance from random is smaller than 112 · p.
2. Assuming that the attacker has a limited budget that prevents her from generating blocks
at a loss for too long, it is possible to extract bits from the Bitcoin ledger with statistical
distance from random that is arbitrarily close to 0.
For the sake of comparison, consider a weak adversary who never attempts to fork the blockchain.
Thus, in this setting, our negative result shows that any beacon protocol is susceptible to bias
that is at most 6 times smaller than the bias of a trivial protocol that extracts the output from a
single predetermined block. This is because the trivial protocol can simply hope that the honest
miners created the predetermined block, and thereby achieve 12p or smaller statistical distance
from random (an adversary who “resets” once achieves |12 (1− p) + 34p− 12 | = 14p). Indeed,
Santha-Vazirani sources [47, 45] exhibit a similar behavior, and we make use of generalized
Santha-Vazirani sources [6] to derive our lower bound.
In case the attacker has less than 1/2 of the mining power and her budget is small enough, our
positive results require n = O( 1ǫ2 log
2 1
ǫ ) Bitcoin blocks to obtain a bit whose statistical distance
from random is at most ǫ. For adversaries with large budgets, our protocols may require an even
larger n. To compare, the lower bound [20] and upper bound [40] on a two-party coin-flipping
protocol have Θ(1ǫ ) rounds for output with ǫ bias. Similar upper bounds exist for multiparty
coin-flipping protocols in the case that at most 2/3 of the parties are corrupt [7, 30], and the best
known protocols when more than 2/3 of the parties are corrupt require Ω( 1
ǫ2
) rounds for output
with ǫ bias [20, 7]. The comparison between blocks and rounds has some sense to it, because
both a Bitcoin block and a round of interaction in a multiparty protocol require propagation of
messages on a network. However, in other regards these two notions are incomparable. On the
one hand, a Bitcoin block requires a significantly longer time (10 minutes on average) than a
typical round of interaction. On the other hand, fetching the Bitcoin block can be done by a
party who does not even participate in the protocol.
The last remark alludes to the main advantage of Bitcoin-based randomness extraction pro-
tocols: unpredictable yet publicly verifiable random bits. In fact, the public verifiability aspect
of the beacon has two advantages that are closely related. First, it enables incorruptible proto-
cols by removing any element of trust in the parties who initiated the system. Second, it allows
everyone, including new parties who have just begun their participation, to be in agreement on
the output of the beacon. Indeed, our results in Section 4 show that all parties reach consensus
on the output that the beacon generates.
1.1 Related works
The idea of using Bitcoin as a public randomness source has been explored in [2] and [16]. The
work of [44] presents negative results with regard to Bitcoin-based randomness extraction in the
presence of unrestricted and budget-restricted adversaries. However, [44] considers protocols
that extract the output from only a single Bitcoin block, unlike our positive results in Section 4.
Also, our lower bound in Section 3 applies to protocols that can use an arbitrary function of all
blocks witnessed as the outputted randomness, and considers a weak adversary who may not
fork the chain, so in this sense our lower bound is more general than the lower bound of [44].
1.2 Organization of the paper
The contributions of this work are organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide some well-
known definitions and tools. In Section 3 we prove that no protocol can achieve an arbitrarily
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small bias when the adversary has an infinite budget. In Section 4 we analyse beacon protocols
that defeat a budget-restricted adversary, first in a simplified model and then in a model that
captures Bitcoin. In Section 4.1 we discuss the rationale for the assumptions that need to be
made with regard to budget-restricted adversaries. In Section 5 we describe a protocol that
combines a public beacon with reliance of trusted parties. In Section 6 we discuss some real-
world considerations that a Bitcoin-based beacon should take into account.
2 Preliminaries
We denote [n] , {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Let Ω denote some finite domain, frequently of the form Ω = Σn for Σ = [d].
For a subset S ⊆ Ω, we denote µ(S) , |S|/|Ω|.
We denote by ∆(X,Y ) , 12Σa∈Ω|X(a)− Y (a)| the statistical distance between two distri-
butions X,Y . Note that in case U is the uniform distribution on Ω = {0, 1} and X also has
support {0, 1}, it holds that |X(0) − 12 | = |(1−X(0)) − 12 | = |X(1) − 12 | = ∆(X,U).
Definition 2.1 (non-oblivious symbol-fixing sources). A distribution X over Σn is an (n, k,Σ)
non-oblivious symbol-fixing source if there exists a subset T = {i1, i2, . . . , ik} ⊆ [n] and a
function f : Σk → Σn−k such that (Xi1 ,Xi2 , . . . ,Xik) is uniformly distributed over Σk, and
(Xj1 ,Xj2 , . . . ,Xjn−k) = f(Xi1 ,Xi2 , . . . ,Xik) where {j1, j2, . . . , jn−k} = [n] \ T .
In the special case of Σ = {0, 1}, we say that X is an (n, k) non-oblivious bit-fixing source.
Definition 2.2 (extractor for symbol-fixing sources). Let S be a family of (n, k,Σ) symbol-fixing
sources. An ǫ-extractor for S is a function ext : Σn → Σ such that ∀X ∈ S : ∆(ext(X), U) ≤ ǫ,
where U is the uniform distribution on Σ.
The following lemma gives sufficent conditions under which the majority function can act as
a randomness extractor. In essence, the lemma shows that the difference between the amount of
0s and 1s among n uniform random bits is concentrated at around
√
n, similarly to the expected
value of the absolute displacement of a simple random walk.
Lemma 2.3. Let f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
{
1
∑n
i=1 xi ≥ n2
0 otherwise
be the majority function, and let
ℓ ,
⌊
ǫπe
√
n−√n⌋. If n is odd and ǫ ≤ eπ then f is an ǫ2-extractor for an (n, n − ℓ + 1)
non-oblivious bit-fixing source.
Proof. By Stirling’s approximation, 12n
( n
n/2
) ≤ 12n e√n(ne )n(√πn( n
2e
)n/2)2
= eπ
1√
n
. Therefore, for every
k ≥ 0, it holds that Pr(k =∑ni=1 xi) ≤ Pr(⌊n2 ⌋ =∑ni=1 xi) ≤ eπ 1√n . Let E denote the event that
f remains undetermined after n− ℓ variables were chosen randomly. Hence,
Pr(E) =
ℓ∑
k=1
Pr
(∑n−ℓ
i=1
xi =
⌈n
2
⌉
− k
)
≤
ℓ∑
k=1
e
π
1√
n− ℓ
ǫ ≤ e
pi︷︸︸︷
≤ ℓ · e
π
1√
n−√n
≤
⌊
ǫ
π
e
√
n−√n
⌋
· e
π
1√
n−√n
≤ ǫ.
Assume that ℓ is even. Since n is odd, it holds that Pr(f(x1, . . . , xn) = 1|¬E) = Pr(
∑n−ℓ
i=1 xi ∈
{⌈n2 ⌉, ⌈n2 ⌉ + 1, . . . , n − ℓ}) and Pr(f(x1, . . . , xn) = 0|¬E) = Pr(
∑n−ℓ
i=1 xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊n2 ⌋ − ℓ}).
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Since
(
n−ℓ
⌈n
2
⌉+k
)
=
(
n−ℓ
n−ℓ−⌈n
2
⌉−k
)
=
(
n−ℓ
⌊n
2
⌋−ℓ−k
)
for k = 0, 1, . . . , ⌊n2 ⌋ − ℓ, we have that Pr(f = 1|¬E) =
Pr(f = 0|¬E) = 1/2. This implies that f is an ǫ2 -extractor for an (n, n−ℓ) non-oblivious bit-fixing
source, because
∆(f(X), U) =
∣∣∣Pr(f(x1, . . . , xn) = 0) − 1
2
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Pr({f = 0} ∩ E)+ Pr({f = 0}|¬E) · Pr(¬E)− 1
2
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Pr({f = 0} ∩ E)+ 1
2
· (1− Pr(E)) − 1
2
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Pr({f = 0} ∩ E)− 1
2
Pr(E)
∣∣∣ ≤ 1
2
Pr(E) ≤ 1
2
ǫ.
If ℓ is odd, the result follows by replacing ℓ with ℓ′ = ℓ− 1.
3 Adversaries with an infinite budget
In this section we prove our lower bound. Our proof is inspired by a lower bound on extraction
from generalized Santha-Vazirani (SV) sources from Appendix B of Beigi, Etesami and Go-
hari [6]. We mention that this proof is based, in turn, on an elegant proof of Reingold, Vadhan
and Wigderson [45] simplifying the original lower bound of [47] for randomness extraction from
SV sources.
The purpose of the next definition is to formally model the distribution of blocks generated
when an adversary has control of a p-th fraction of the mining power. We define a relatively
weak adversary A. Specifically, A does not have the power to fork the network and try to create
alternate chains. The only thing A is able to do is to try to mine the next block himself, and
if he succeeds before the honest miners, he can decide whether to publish this block or let the
honest miners publish their version of the next block. Furthermore, A must make this decision
before seeing the honest miners’ version of the next block. Note that one may regard A to be
an adversary with an infinite budget, under the interpretation that producing each block has a
cost and A can discard block rewards without repercussions. Let us emphasize that since we
use this definition for our randomness extraction impossibility result, the weak adversary model
makes the result stronger. Indeed, if we assume that all adversaries have an infinite budget, A is
weaker than the adversary A1 of theMFL model (cf. Figure 1), yet A1 is the weakest adversary
that we will consider later in our positive results. We proceed to the formal definition.
Definition 3.1 (p-resettable source). Fix integers d and n, and 0 < p ≤ 1. A distribution X
on [d]n is a p-resettable source, or simply p-resettable, if it can be sampled symbol by symbol by
a randomized algorithm A via the following process. For any x1, . . . , xi−1 ∈ [d]i−1, given that
X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1, Xi is sampled as follows.
1. A uniform element a ∈ [d] is chosen.
2. With probability 1 − p, Xi is set to a. Otherwise, a is given to algorithm A. A can now
choose, given access to a and x1, . . . , xi−1, either to set Xi = a, or discard a and then
choose a new uniform element b ∈ [d] and set Xi = b.
We emphasize that A must choose whether to ‘reset’ Xi, i.e. to discard a, before sampling b.
Note that using the definition above also for n = 1, we have that if for every i ∈ [n], and
every x1, . . . , xi−1 ∈ [d]i−1 (Xi|X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1) is p-resettable, then X is p-resettable.
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Proof idea: We sketch the idea of the proof, relating it to the proofs of [45] and [6]. [45] show
an extraction lower bound for the family of ‘slightly imbalanced sources’. These are distributions
on [d]n with the property that the ratio of the probabilities given to any two strings in [d]n is
close to one. Most of our work will be to show that any slightly imbalanced source is in fact a
p-resettable source. This is a similar strategy to [6], that ‘embed’ slightly imbalanced sources
into generalized SV sources for the purpose of their lower bound. We begin with the definition
of a p-perturbed distribution on [d], which will be useful for this purpose.
Definition 3.2. A distribution X on [d] is called p-perturbed, if for any element a ∈ [d],
(1− p)/d ≤ Pr(X = a) ≤ (1 + p)/d.
Lemma 3.3. Let X be a distribution on [d], and fix any 0 < p ≤ 1. If X is p/2-perturbed then
X is a p-resettable source.
Proof. Fix X that is p/2-perturbed. For a ∈ [d], we define a quantity ua to measure “how much
probability a is given beyond required minimum”. Formally, we define
ua , Pr(X = a) · d− (1− p/2).
Note that, as X is p/2-perturbed, 0 ≤ ua ≤ p for all a ∈ [d].
Consider the following sampling procedure.
1. Sample a ∈ [d] uniformly.
2. With probability 1− p+ ua, output a. Otherwise, output a uniform b ∈ [d].
We claim the distrbution Y sampled by this procedure is a p-resettable source. This is because
the “resetting”, i.e. outputting b rather than a, always happens with probability at most p, even
after conditioning on the value of a. We denote by η the probability that resetting occurred;
i.e., the overall probability that the procedure outputs b rather than a, without conditioning on
the value of a. We have
µ = Ea∈[d][p− ua] = p/2,
as Ea∈[d][ua] = p/2.
Fix any c ∈ [d]. We will show that Pr(Y = c) = Pr(X = c); this implies Y ≡ X which means
X is a p-resettable source. The event Y = c is a union of the following two disjoint events A
and B:
• A: c was output as a in the first stage of the procedure. We have
Pr(A) = 1/d · (1− p+ uc).
• B: c was output as b in the resetting stage. Pr(B) is the product of the probability η = p/2
that resetting occurred times 1/d, as given that we are resetting, the output is uniform.
Thus, for any c ∈ [d], we have
Pr(Y = c) = (1− p+ uc)/d + (p/2)/d = (1− p/2 + uc)/d = Pr(X = c).
Therefore, X is a p-resettable source.
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Claim 3.4. Fix 0 < q ≤ 1/3. We have
1− 2q ≤ 1− q
1 + q
≤ 1 + q
1− q ≤ 1 + 3q.
Theorem 3.5. For any function E : [d]n → {0, 1} and any 0 < p ≤ 1, there is a p-resettable
source X such that E(X) has bias at least p/12.
Proof. Fix any function E : [d]n → {0, 1}, and any 0 < p ≤ 1. Assume w.l.o.g. that µ(E−1(0)) ≥
1/2, and fix a set S ⊆ E−1(0) with µ(S) = 1/2 (Here we assumed for simplicity d is even.
Otherwise, the proof can be altered). Define a distribution X on [d]n as follows.
• Any x ∈ S has probability (1 + p/6)/dn
• Any x /∈ S has probability (1− p/6)/dn
We have Pr(E(X) = 0) ≥ 1/2+p/12. It is left to show that X is a p-resettable source. Note
that for any set T ⊆ [d]n,
(1− p/6) · µ(T ) ≤ Pr(X ∈ T ) ≤ (1 + p/6) · µ(T ).
Fix i ∈ [n], x1, . . . , xi−1 ∈ [d]i−1, and a ∈ [d]. Denote
ηa , Pr(Xi = a|X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1) = Pr(X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi=1,Xi = a)
Pr(X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1)
We know that
(1− p/6) · d−n+(i+1) ≤ Pr(X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1) ≤ (1 + p/6) · d−n+(i+1),
(1− p/6) · d−n+i ≤ Pr(X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi = xi) ≤ (1 + p/6) · d−n+i.
Using Claim 3.4 with q = p/6, we have
(1− p/3)/d ≤ 1− p/6
d(1 + p/6)
≤ ηa ≤ 1 + p/6
d(1 − p/6) ≤ (1 + p/2)/d
Thus, for any i ∈ [n], x1, . . . , xi−1 ∈ [d]i−1, (Xi|X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1) is p/2-perturbed,
and therefore p-resettable. It follows that X is a p-resettable source.
Remark 3.6 (Extractors with unbounded input length). One may wonder whether an extractor
that does not have a fixed input length n can get smaller error. However, for any such extractor
E and any ǫ > 0, we can take n such that the probability that E produces an output after n
symbols is at least 1 − ǫ, and define E′ to be the extractor that reads n symbols and answers
according to E, or answers 0 if E hasn’t terminated. (It seems a reasonable assumption that
such n exists if E is to be useful). By the lower bound, E′ has error at least p/12, which implies
the error of E is at least p/12− ǫ. As this holds for any ǫ > 0, the error of E must be at least,
say, p/13.
Remark 3.7 (Efficiency of the adversary). The proof of Theorem 3.5 shows that there exists
a p-resettable source that will bias the output of E. One may wonder, if the “adversary can
be efficient”; that is, whether the algorithm A from Definition 3.1 - deciding whether to “reset
or not”, can be efficient. Examination of the proof shows that when E is computable in time
poly(n, d); we can construct a p-resettable source X ′ where A will operate in time poly(n, d)
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and such that E(X ′) will have bias at least p/13. We sketch why this is so. Let X be the
distribution defined in the beginning of the proof of Theorem 3.5. We assume for simplcity here
that Pr(E(x) = 0) = 1/2; otherwise, we must start by approximating this probability and this
will add an arbitrarily small error term. We first observe that when E is efficiently computable,
the distrbution X can be efficiently sampled: Simply choose random x ∈ [d]n, compute E(x),
and discard x and resample with the appropriate probability when E(x) = 1, to give x’s with
E(x) = 0 the desired larger probability (1+ p/6)/dn. In a similar way, we can efficiently sample
distributions of the form (X|X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1), by starting with a random x ∈ [d]n with
prefix (x1, . . . , xi−1), rather than a completely uniform x ∈ [d]n. Thus, we can approximate the
probabilities ηa , Pr(Xi = a|X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1) appearing in the proof. Inspection of
the proof of Lemma 3.3 shows these probabilities are all we need to sample X correctly; thus, A
can efficiently approximate X.
4 Beacon for budget-restricted adversaries
It is entirely reasonable to assume that a Bitcoin miner will incur significant losses if she does not
claim the rewards for a large portion (such as half) of the blocks that she produces, and hence
she will deplete her budget when she employs a strategy of this kind. Still, the beacon protocol
needs to establish its correctness in the face of an adversary who wishes to offset such losses by
attempting to accumulate profits during certain periods of the protocol execution. With this in
mind, let us provide the following abstract assumption.
Assumption 4.1. Let maxprofits : Q × N → Q be a function that is monotonically increasing
in both of its arguments. Consider a Bitcoin miner who invested t coins to buy her mining
equipment. For any segment of n consecutive blocks of the chain, the amount of coins profit
(i.e., revenues minus operating expenses) that this miner will earn as a result of creating some
portion of the blocks in this segment is bounded by maxprofits(t, n).
The function maxprofits bounds the profitability of generating blocks. For now, maxprofits
can be thought of as satisfying the condition ∀n : maxprofits(t, n) ≤ 2t. See Section 4.1 for a
more thorough examination of Assumption 4.1, and in particular Example 4.13 with regard to
why Assumption 4.1 is unavoidable.
To explain the main considerations that come into play in a budget-restricted setting, let us
first provide a proof in a simplified model MFL, that is specified in Figure 1. In this model,
blockchain forks never occur, and all parties including the adversary create blocks only at the
head of the chain. Note that we associate each block with a formal symbol, and so we use the
terms “block” and “symbol” interchangeably.
Let us consider a protocol that outputs a single bit. Since we may assume w.l.o.g. that the
adversary wishes to bias the output towards 1, and that each block is associated with a symbol
that is represented by bits, we define the following notation.
Definition 4.2. A “helpful” block is a block such that the symbol that is associated with it has 1
as its least significant bit (LSB). Likewise, a “detrimental” block is a block such that the symbol
that is associated with it has LSB that equals 0.
In the following lemma, the parameter δ measures how large the profit margin of the ad-
versary can be. For example, one may think of δ = 2/3 throughout the analysis. If p is rather
small so that p′ = p/21−p/2 ≈ p/2, the profit margin zp = px − yp should be small enough so that
wp =
1
δp
′x− yp ≈ 1δ 12px− yp = 34px− yp is a negative number. Even in the case that p is quite
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Forkless model MFL
The forkless model with parameter p proceeds in turns, as follows:
1. In each turn, the adversary A1 is successful with probability p and unsuccessful with proba-
bility 1− p.
2. In case A1 is successful, she receives a uniform random block from the random oracle and can
either discard it or extend the head of the chain with it.
3. In case A1 is unsuccessful, the chain is extended with a uniform random block.
Figure 1: The forkless model.
large, say p = 1/5, if we substitute exemplary numbers such as x = 50, yp = 9, zp = 50/5− 9 = 1,
we get that wp = 3/2 · 1/9 ·50−9 = −2/3 < 0. Thus, in the case of δ = 2/3, the parameter n should
be large enough so that p0 = exp{−13(1δ − 1)2δℓ} = exp{− ℓ18} is negligible.
Lemma 4.3. Consider an adversary A1 who operates in the model MFL with parameter p.
Assume that A1 purchased her p fraction of the mining power with t1 coins, and that she has
a reserve of t2 additional coins. Denote T (i) , t2 + maxprofits(t1, i). Assume that each block
reward is x coins, and that each attempt by A1 to solve the next block costs her at least yp coins.
Denote the maximal profit margin of A1 by zp , px− yp > 0 coins. Denote p′ , p/21−p/2 . Assume
that zp is small enough so that wp ,
1
δp
′x − yp < 0 for some constant δ ∈ (12 , 1). Assume that
A1 stops operating if she runs out of coins. Consider the following beacon protocol:
1. Fetch n consecutive blocks B1, B2, . . . , Bn from the blockchain.
2. Obtain a bit bi from each Bi by taking the LSB of the symbol that is associated with Bi.
3. Output the bit majority(b1, b2, . . . , bn).
Let ǫ > 0 be arbitrary. Denote ℓ , ⌊ǫπe
√
n−√n⌋, p0 , e− 13 ( 1δ−1)2δℓ. If n is taken to be large
enough so that T (n)+δ 1p′ ℓwp < 0, then this protocol outputs a bit whose statistical distance from
a uniform random bit is at most ǫ+ p0 +
e
π
1√
n−ℓ .
Proof. The adversary A1 may opt to increase her t2 coins reserve by operating as an honest
miner in some locations, even though that entails that A1 would then have less opportunities to
influence the output of the beacon in the remaining locations. Assume w.l.o.g. that A1 wishes to
bias the output of the beacon towards 1. SinceA1 only extends the head of the chain, the optimal
strategy that she can deploy must be of a form in which A1 alternates between the following
two modes. In the first mode, A1 operates as an honest miner, meaning that she publishes
every block Bi that she creates, regardless of whether Bi is a “helpful” or “detrimental” block.
In the second mode, A1 inspects the LSB of each block Bi that she successfully created, and
publishes Bi only if it is a “helpful” block, otherwise she discards Bi. Suppose for the moment
that A1 never switches to the first mode after she discards a “detrimental” block but before
the next turn of MFL. The strategy of A1 can thus be viewed as adaptively selecting d ≤ n
locations in which she plays as an honest miner, and in the other n − d locations A1 discards
all the “detrimental” blocks that she creates. Hence, while operating in the second mode,
A1 will successfully create the block and collect the reward of each location with probability
1
2p + (
1
2p)
2 + (12p)
3 + . . . =
p/2
1−p/2 = p
′. To decide the outcome of ℓ locations, A1 needs ℓ
successes that occur with probability p′ each, because a failed trial does not deny the location
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from having a uniform random symbol. Let Y = Y (ℓ, p′) be a random variable with negative
binomial distribution that counts the number of trials until ℓ successes. By using a tail inequality
[17, 24] for the binomial distribution B(δ 1p′ ℓ, p
′), we obtain
Pr(Y < δ · E[Y ]) = Pr(Y < δ 1
p′
ℓ) = Pr(B(δ
1
p′
ℓ, p′) > ℓ) ≤ e− 13 ( 1δ−1)2δℓ = p0.
If the event E2 , {Y ≥ δ 1p′ ℓ} occurs then the gains and losses of A1 until she influences
the majority function ℓ times will sum up to S = ℓx + δ 1p′ ℓ(−yp) = δ 1p′ ℓwp coins or less.
Notice that A1’s average cost per trial is in fact greater than yp, because each trial may involve
several turns. Also note that if the success probability of A1 was p rather than p′ then the
sum S would be a multiple of 1δpx − yp > zp and hence positive. Let us refer to the blocks
that A1 created while operating in the second mode as marked blocks, and let E3 , {A1
contributed at most ℓ marked blocks among B1, B2, . . . , Bn}. According to Assumption 4.1, the
total amount of coins that A1 may earn while playing honestly in the d locations is bounded
by maxprofits(t1, d) ≤ maxprofits(t1, n), and hence T (n) represents the maximal budget that A1
has for playing in the n− d locations. Since we assume that T (n) + S < 0 and A1 does not go
under budget, we have that E2 ⊆ E3 holds, because the occurrence of E2 implies that A1 stops
operating after she played in at most ℓ out of the n− d locations. Note that if δ 1p′ ℓ > n− d then
the occurrence of E2 implies that A1 failed to reach ℓ successes irrespective of her T (n) budget,
meaning that E2 ⊆ E3 in this case too.
Let E4 , {the amount of marked blocks that A1 contributed among B1, B2, . . . , Bn is at
least as large as the difference between “helpful” and “detrimental” blocks among the unmarked
blocks of B1, B2, . . . , Bn}. Thus, following Lemma 2.3, we have that Pr(E4|E3) ≤ ǫ.
Let E1 , {majority(b1, b2, . . . , bn) = 1}. Since a tie among n− ℓ uniform random bits occurs
with probability eπ
1√
n−ℓ at the most (cf. Lemma 2.3), we have Pr(E1|¬E4 ∩ E3) ≤
1
2 +
e
π
1√
n−ℓ .
Hence, we obtain
Pr(E1) ≤ Pr(E1 ∩ E3) + Pr(E1 ∩ ¬E3) ≤ Pr(E1 ∩ E3) + Pr(¬E3)
≤ Pr(E1 ∩ E3 ∩ E4) + Pr(E1 ∩ E3 ∩ ¬E4) + Pr(¬E2)
≤ Pr(E4|E3) + Pr(E1|¬E4 ∩ E3) + p0
≤ ǫ+ (1
2
+
e
π
1√
n− ℓ
)
+ p0.
Now, if A1 is allowed to switch to the first mode after she discards a “detrimental” block but
before the next turn, we can still count such a trial as a loss of yp coins. This means that in case
A1 succeeds to create the next block it will be accounted for as playing honestly in one of the d
locations, and therefore the total number of trials can exceed n − d (implying that the success
probability in a trial is less than p′). Note that A1 should never switch from the first mode to
the second mode before she succeeds to create a block, since the only purpose of operating in
the first mode is to avoid going under budget. Therefore, Pr(E1) ≤ ǫ + 12 + eπ 1√n−ℓ + p0 holds
even if A1 may adaptively switch between modes in the course of a trial.
Overall, the statistical distance between the output bit and a uniform random bit is at most∣∣∣∣Pr(E1)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣ǫ+ 12 + eπ 1√n− ℓ + p0 − 12
∣∣∣∣ = ǫ+ p0 + eπ 1√n− ℓ.
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The reason why the above protocol can terminate immediately after the nth block has been
fetched is that even unintentional forks do not occur in MFL, hence none of the n blocks can
be reversed.
Let us now broaden Lemma 4.3 to a model that captures Bitcoin. The model that we employ
is the Bitcoin backbone formulation, that was proposed in [27]. In this setting, an adversary
with p fraction of the mining power may be able to create more than p fraction of the blocks in
expectation, due to adversarial strategies that take advantage of blockchain forks (cf. [25, 48]).
Yet, Assumption 4.1 is reasonable in this model too, per the discussion in Section 4.1.
Overview 4.4. In the framework of [27], there are N parties (or N miners), and an adversary A
is allowed to statically corrupt t of them and use their quota of hashing queries. Hash invocations
in [27] are modeled as random oracle queries, and hence the mining power of A is β , tqT/2κ,
where q is the quota of queries that a miner has in each round of an execution of the backbone
protocol, T is the difficulty target, and κ is the length of the digest. The mining power of the
honest miners is α , (N − t)qT/2κ, and γ , α2 − α represents a lower bound on the power of
the honest miners after unintentional forks are taken into consideration (see [27, Section 4.1] for
further details).
Thus, α and β correspond to 1− p and p in the model MFL.
In [27], the adversary A together with the environment Z can orchestrate an attack against
the protocol execution in any way feasible, independently of the actual cost that the attack
might be worth. Therefore, we augment [27] with the following definitions, that serve as the
basis for the interpretations that we will soon provide.
Definition 4.5. Let BB,ℓ,L be a predicate that is parameterized by a block B and lengths ℓ and
L. Given a chain C and an adversary A, let CA denote an annotated chain that specifies for
each of its blocks whether it was created by A. We say that BB,ℓ,L is a bankruptcy predicate if
for any adversary A and for any chain C, it holds that BB,ℓ,L(CA) = 1 iff CA contains a segment
of L consecutive blocks that starts with B, and A created at most ℓ out of these L blocks.
Definition 4.6. An execution of the backbone protocol is said to have a bankruptcy event w.r.t.
an adversary A and a bankruptcy predicate BB,ℓ,L if it holds that at some round r of the execution,
every honest party P adopts a chain CAP for which BB,ℓ,L(CAP ) = 1.
Let us clarify that Definition 4.6 does not imply anything about the level of anonymity in
the system. That is to say, an honest party does not necessarily know which blocks were created
by A, but due to the agreement among all honest parties we have that w.h.p. A will not collect
more than ℓ rewards in a segment of L blocks that starts at the block B.
The beacon protocol πbeacon is given in Figure 2. The following Lemma shows that an adver-
sary who discards “detrimental” blocks will either fail to influence πbeacon, or become bankrupt
while trying. In the denotations of this Lemma, the event Eb ∩ ¬Eℓ implies that the adversary
continued to operate after she went bankrupt. While the Bitcoin backbone formulation itself does
not prevent this possibility, one may consider an extended model in which Pr(Eb ∩ ¬Eℓ) = 0.
Lemma 4.7. Let ǫ > 0, n ≥ 1, k ≥ 1 be arbitrary. Following Overview 4.4, assume that the
mining power of the adversary A2 is β, and that γ = λ(1+δ)β is satisfied for some δ ∈ (0, 1), λ ∈
[1,∞). Denote ℓ , ⌊ ǫ2 πe
√
n−√n⌋, L , ⌈2(1 − δ3)−1λℓ⌉. Suppose that an honest party invokes
the protocol πbeacon. Let Eb be the bankruptcy event w.r.t. A2 and the predicate BB1,ℓ,L, and let
Eℓ , {A2 contributed at most ℓ of the blocks B1, B2, . . . , Bn}. If A2 never publishes any of the
“detrimental” blocks that she creates, then πbeacon outputs a bit whose statistical distance from
a uniform random bit is ǫ+ Pr(Eb ∩ ¬Eℓ) + (Ω(
√
n))−1 + e−Ω(δ
2ℓ) + e−Ω(k) at the most.
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Protocol πbeacon
1. Fetch n consecutive blocks B1, B2, . . . , Bn from the Bitcoin blockchain, such that Bn has
already been extended by k additional blocks.
2. Obtain a bit bi from each Bi by taking the LSB of the symbol that is associated with Bi.
3. Output the bit majority(b1, b2, . . . , bn).
Figure 2: The beacon protocol.
Proof. SinceA2 discards all of the “detrimental” blocks that she obtains from the random oracle,
she can be regarded as an adversary whose mining power is β′ = β/2. Thus, for λ′ = 2λ, the
equality γ = λ′(1 + δ)β′ holds.
Let Es = {A2 contributed at least as many blocks among B1, B2, . . . , Bn as the differ-
ence between “helpful” and “detrimental” blocks that the honest miners contributed among
B1, B2, . . . , Bn}. We have “s” in Es to indicate that A2 succeeded to influence the output bit.
Since we defined ℓ with ǫ2 instead of ǫ, Lemma 2.3 implies that Pr(Es|Eℓ) ≤ ǫ2 holds.
For the chain of consecutive blocks B1, B2, . . . , Bn, . . . that an honest party fetches and
thereby derives the output of the protocol, let Bm be the ℓ
th block that A2 contributed. In
other words, A2 contributed ℓ of the first m blocks, and the honest miners created the other
m− ℓ blocks. Denote Eq , {m ≥ L}. According to [27, Theorem 10], the chain quality property
entails that Pr(Eq) = 1− e−Ω(δ2m) ≥ 1− e−Ω(δ2ℓ). In fact, [27, Theorem 10] guarantees an even
stronger property, see Remark 4.11. The letter “q” in Eq refers to the quality of the segment
B1, B2, . . . , BL.
Let r denote the round at which the protocol πbeacon terminated. Let us define Ec ,
{At round r, the block Bn is included in every chain of of every honest party}. Due to the com-
mon prefix property [27, Theorem 9], it holds that Pr(Ec) = 1 − e−Ω(k). We have “c” in Ec to
indicate that the common prefix B1, B2, . . . , Bn is in consensus.
Let us consider two cases.
For the first case, we assume that L ≤ n. Here, it holds that ¬Eb ∩ Eq ⊆ ¬Ec, because
Eq ∩ Ec ⊆ Eb. The reason that Eq ∩ Ec ⊆ Eb holds is as follows. If Ec occurred, then for every
honest party P we have that the chain CP,r that P adopted at round r includes B1, B2, . . . , Bn.
If Eq occurred, then for any chain C that contains B1, B2, . . . , Bn we have BB1,ℓ,L(CA2) = 1.
Hence, if both Eq and Ec occurred, then at round r every honest party P adopted a chain CP,r
such that BB1,ℓ,L(CA2P,r) = 1. This implies that Eb occurred.
By the law of total of total probability, we obtain
Pr(¬Eb ∩ Es) = Pr((¬Eb ∩Es ∩ Eℓ) ∪ (¬Eb ∩ Es ∩ ¬Eq) ∪ (¬Eb ∩ Es ∩ ¬Eℓ ∩ Eq))
≤ Pr(Es ∩ Eℓ) + Pr(¬Eq) + Pr(¬Eb ∩Eq)
≤ Pr(Es|Eℓ)Pr(Eℓ) + e−Ω(δ2ℓ) + Pr(¬Ec)
≤ Pr(Es|Eℓ) + e−Ω(δ2ℓ) + e−Ω(k) ≤ ǫ
2
+ e−Ω(δ
2ℓ) + e−Ω(k).
For the second case, we assume that L > n. Here, Eq ⊆ Eℓ. Therefore,
Pr(Es) = Pr((Es ∩ Eℓ) ∪ Pr(Es ∩ ¬Eℓ)
≤ Pr(Es|Eℓ)Pr(Eℓ) + Pr(Es ∩ ¬Eℓ)
≤ Pr(Es|Eℓ) + Pr(¬Eℓ)
≤ ǫ
2
+ Pr(¬Eq) ≤ ǫ
2
+ e−Ω(δ
2ℓ).
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Thus, the second case implies an even smaller bound on Pr(¬Eb ∩ Es).
Let E0 , {majority(b1, b2, . . . , bn) = 0}. Since ¬Es implies that more than half of the bits
b1, b2, . . . , bn are uniform random, and since a tie among n/2 uniform random bits occurs with
probability eπ
1√
n/2
at the most (cf. Lemma 2.3), we have Pr(¬E0∩¬Es) ≤ 12+ eπ 1√n/2 . Therefore,
Pr(¬E0 ∩ (¬Eb ∪ Eℓ)) = Pr(¬E0 ∩ (¬Eb ∪ Eℓ) ∩ Es) + Pr(¬E0 ∩ (¬Eb ∪ Eℓ) ∩ ¬Es)
≤ Pr((¬Eb ∪Eℓ) ∩ Es) + Pr(¬E0 ∩ ¬Es)
≤ Pr(Es|Eℓ)Pr(Eℓ) + Pr(¬Eb ∩ Es) + Pr(¬E0 ∩ ¬Es)
≤ ǫ
2
+
( ǫ
2
+ e−Ω(δ
2ℓ) + e−Ω(k)
)
+
(1
2
+
e
π
1√
n/2
)
.
This implies
Pr(E0) + Pr(Eb ∩ ¬Eℓ) ≥ Pr(E0 ∪ (Eb ∩ ¬Eℓ)) ≥ 1
2
− e
π
1√
n/2
− ǫ− e−Ω(δ2ℓ) − e−Ω(k).
Since A2 tries to bias the output towards 1, we obtain that the statistical distance between the
output bit and a uniform random bit is at most∣∣∣Pr(E0)− 1
2
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣1
2
− (ǫ+ Pr(Eb ∩ ¬Eℓ) + e
π
1√
n/2
+ e−Ω(δ
2ℓ) + e−Ω(k))− 1
2
∣∣∣
= ǫ+ Pr(Eb ∩ ¬Eℓ) + e
√
2
π
1√
n
+ e−Ω(δ
2ℓ) + e−Ω(k).
Remark 4.8. Lemma 4.7 also guarantees agreement on the output bit among all the honest
miners. Let j denote the distance from the genesis block to B1, and consider the event Ea ,
{B1, B2, . . . , Bn reside in every chain of length j + n+ k or more that an honest miner adopts}.
According to [27, Theorem 9], we have Pr(Ea) = 1 − e−Ω(k). Therefore, Pr(¬E0 ∨ ¬Ea) ≤
Pr(¬E0)+Pr(¬Ea) ≤ 12 + ǫ+Pr(Eb ∩¬Eℓ)+ (Ω(
√
n))−1+ e−Ω(δ2ℓ)+ ❆2e−Ω(k). This implies that
the output bit of the beacon is publicly verifiable in the following sense: any honest party can
verify the validity of some n + k consecutive blocks and compute the bit that the first n blocks
derive, and have the assurance that this bit is close to uniform and that w.h.p. every other
honest party will derive the same bit.
It should be noted that the hidden constants in the terms e−Ω(k) and e−Ω(δ2ℓ) depend on a
parameter f that measures the synchronicity of the honest miners, as can be seen by inspecting
[27, Theorem 9] and [27, Theorem 10]. However, with 10 minutes average block interval as in
Bitcoin, and reasonable assumptions on the network propagation latency [22], the probability
of forks by the honest miners is less than 3%, and therefore the constant f is quite modest.
Observation 4.9. We may suppose w.l.o.g. that A2 ceaselessly tries to create blocks for as long
as she is not bankrupt, since an adversary A0 who opts to remain idle (instead of submitting
queries to the random oracle at some rounds of the backbone protocol execution) gains nothing by
doing so. This is because the majority function is influenced only by the total amount of blocks
that A0 contributes among the n blocks, and therefore it is better to create the blocks as soon as
possible. Hence, A2 is at least as powerful w.r.t. influencing the output bit of πbeacon as A0 is.
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The above observation leads us to the following interpretation.
Interpretation 4.10. Consider the adversary A2 of Lemma 4.7. Suppose that every block B
that A2 creates such that B will be included in every chain of every honest party from a certain
round,A2 earns x coins. Suppose that for every block that will be included in every chain of every
honest miner from a certain round, A2 loses either y(β) or more coins. Because Observation
4.9 allows us to assume that A2 attempts to create every block, y(β) represents the operating
expenses of A2 for each block that she either succeeded or failed to create, and x represents
the reward that A2 earns for a block that she successfully created. For β = β′NqT/2κ, denote
zβ , β
′x − y(β). The quantity zβ can be regarded as an upper bound on the “honest” profit
margin of A2 per block, i.e., it is an approximation of the profit margin that A2 can initially
expect in case she extends only the head of the chain. It is therefore reasonable to assume that
zβ > 0. Denote wβ ,
1
2
1
λ(1− δ3)x−y(β). As implied by [27, Theorem 10], the quantity wβ can be
viewed as an upper bound on profit margin of A while she deploys any adversarial strategy but
discards half of the blocks that she creates. Hence, in case A2 has an initial reserve of R coins
but she was only able to create at most ℓ of the first L blocks in πbeacon, she would be left with
a supply of R+ ℓ ·x−L · y(β) = R+ ℓ(1− δ3) 1λ′wβ or less coins. Suppose that zβ is small enough
so that wβ < 0. Suppose that ℓ is large enough so that R + ℓ(1 − δ3) 1λ′wβ < 0 holds. We can
now see that the formal bankruptcy event coincides with the interpretation that A2 depleted her
entire initial budget of R coins. Specifically, using the denotations of Lemma 4.7, the occurrence
of Eq ∩ Ec is interpreted to mean that A2 ran out of coins while trying to contribute as many
blocks as possible among the first L blocks. This is because Ec implies that all honest miners
would agree that the only coins that A2 earned are these ≤ ℓx coin rewards, and thus A2 would
have no other coins of value.
For instance, consider δ = 1100 , β =
N/5 · qT/2κ, λ = 3.9, and let us suppose that A2 can
deploy a strategy that enables her to earn up to 13.9 (1 − 1300)x − y(β) > zβ = 15x − y(β) coins
per block. However, when A2 discards half of her solved blocks, we expect her profits per block
to be 17.8
299
300x− y(β) at the most, for any adversarial strategy that she deploys.
At this point, let us consider the broader range of adversaries. The next remark will come
useful in the analysis that follows it.
Remark 4.11. A closer examination of [27, Theorem 10] reveals that the mining power of A2
will allow her to create a supply of ℓ′ blocks such that she will be able to include either all of
these ℓ′ blocks or less in a chain that consists of L = (1 − δ3)−1λℓ consecutive blocks in total,
and the probability that the size of this supply satisfies ℓ′ > ℓ is e−Ω(δ
2L), and hence also e−Ω(δ
2ℓ)
at the most1. Therefore, we can regard A2 as an even more powerful adversary who operates in
two phases. In the first phase, A2 creates a private chain C that starts from the genesis block, by
submitting queries to the random oracle. Then, at whichever round that A2 desires, she switches
to the second phase, where she picks any chain C′ of an honest party, and is then granted the
unusual power of being able to instantly find a nonce that modifies the second block of C so that
it would extend the last block of C′ rather than the genesis block. Then, A2 broadcasts the valid
chain C′ → C, and from then on she may only extend chains that include C.
We are now ready to show that Lemma 4.7 together with Assumption 4.1 guarantee that
when n is large enough, any budget-restricted adversary will fail to influence the beacon. Keep
in mind that this requires a realistic profits bound, otherwise the lower bound of Section 3 would
apply (as illustrated in Example 4.13).
1The parameter ℓ of [27, Theorem 10] is denoted by L in our case.
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Interpretation 4.12. Consider an adversary A3 who may deploy any possible strategy, which
implies that she may publish “detrimental” blocks. Suppose that the mining power of A3 is also
β, and that she purchased this mining power with R1 coins. Suppose that A3 has an additional
reserve of R2 coins. For the parameter n that πbeacon is invoked with, suppose that the adversary
A2 has a reserve of R2 +maxprofits(R1, n) coins. Following Interpretation 4.10, let us note that
we expect zβ to diminish over time, as can be inferred by Assumption 4.1. One way to think of
it is that y(β) grows because A2 needs to keep expending more resources in order to maintain
β level of mining power relative to the honest miners, by buying new mining equipment and
repairing old equipment. Let us assume that n0 and ℓ0 , ⌊ ǫ2 πe
√
n0 −√n0⌋ are large enough
so that the condition R2 + maxprofits(R1, n0) + ℓ0(1 − δ3) 1λ′wβ < 0 holds. The adversary A3
may opt to include “detrimental” blocks that she created and increase her coins reserve this
way, thereby allowing her to carry on playing before she runs out of coins, albeit at the cost
of influencing the beacon in the wrong direction. However, according to Assumption 4.1, the
maximal amount of coins that A3 can earn is maxprofits(R1, n0). In view of Remark 4.11, we can
regard A2 as building one secretive private chain. This means that it is never beneficial for A2
to broadcast a shorter chain that includes “detrimental” blocks that she solved in order to win
an intermediate race against the honest miners. Therefore, the only possible advantage that A2
would have had if she was capable of including “detrimental” blocks in her chain is the ability
to earn extra revenues in order to avoid going under budget. Since the initial budget of A2 has
maxprofits(R1, n0) more coins than the initial budget of A3, it follows that although A2 must
discard all of her “detrimental” blocks, it is less probable that she will run out of coins before
A3 runs out of coins, than vice verse. Thus, it is more likely than not that A2 will contribute
at least the same amount of “helpful” blocks as A3 contributes. Since A2 achieves a bias of
ǫ + Pr(Eb ∩ ¬Eℓ) + (Ω(
√
n))−1 + e−Ω(δ2ℓ) + e−Ω(k) at the most, it thus follows that the bias
that A3 achieves is also ǫ+ Pr(Eb ∩ ¬Eℓ) + (Ω(
√
n))−1 + e−Ω(δ
2ℓ) + e−Ω(k) or less. Let us draw
attention to the facts that A2 goes bankrupt except with negligible probability, while A3 does
not necessarily go bankrupt. Yet, we have that both A2 and A3 are destined to fail in their
attempt to influence the output bit of πbeacon, unless they can continue to operate after they
become bankrupt.
Hence, Interpretation 4.12 demonstrates that for any adversary A with an arbitrary initial
budget, we can set n and k to be large enough so that the bias of the beacon is arbitrarily small.
Concretely, to achieve bias of at most ǫ, Lemma 4.7 requires e−Ω(δ
2ℓ) ≤ ǫ for ℓ = ⌊ ǫ2 πe
√
n−√n⌋.
Since e−ǫ
√
n ≤ ǫ ⇔ n ≥ 1
ǫ2
log2 1ǫ , Interpretation 4.12 implies that n = O(
1
ǫ2
log2 1ǫ ) blocks are
enough, unless the budget and profits of A are large enough so that R2 + maxprofits(R1, n) is
greater than ≈ 12λ(−wβ)ℓ ≈ 12λ(−wβ) log 1ǫ . Notice that in case maxprofits(R1, n) = Ω(
√
n),
Interpretation 4.12 does not imply that an arbitrarily small ǫ bias can be achieved. However,
per Section 4.1, it is reasonable to assume that maxprofits(R1, n) ≤ 2R1.
Let us note that Observation 4.9 should hold even in more complex models. For instance, it
would hold in a model in which an adversary A can gain a windfall of coins due to an external
event that occurs with some likelihood. This is because of Remark 4.11 and the fact that the
majority extractor is influenced only by the total amount of locations that A controls, which
together imply that A can play until she runs out of coins and then wait for the external event to
occur and thereby negate her bankruptcy. Furthermore, zβ > 0 also implies that Observation 4.9
would hold in complex models.
A superficial review of Lemma 4.7 may lead one to believe that the assumption that the
adversary has less than 12 of the mining power is inessential. While the constraint γ = λ(1+ δ)β
is required in order to invoke [27, Theorem 9] and [27, Theorem 10], the transformation from
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λ to λ′ = 2λ may seem to imply that an adversary with mining power β ≈ 2/3 · NqT/2κ can
also be coped with. However, let us show that Assumption 4.1 may no longer make sense under
these conditions. Let 12 < β
′ < 23 . An adversary A4 with mining power β = β′NqT/2κ succeeds
with probability 1 to create a private longest chain, by winning the race against the honest
miners [46, 41]. This longest chain can be arbitrarily large, and it consist of blocks that only A4
contributed. Note that A4 would not discard any of the blocks that she creates while working on
this private chain. Hence, following Interpretation 4.10, A4 collects a reward of x coins per each
of the blocks in this private chain. Although the honest profit margin is zβ = β
′x− y(β), these
observations imply that the effective profit margin of A4 reaches x− y(β) when she mounts an
attack. Suppose that A4 acquired her β mining power with t coins. If Assumption 4.1 entails
that maxprofits(t, n) = O(t) even in the case that A4 collects all of the block rewards, then
Interpretation 4.12 still holds. On the other hand, if we make the plausible assumption that
every block costs A4 at most x− c coins to produce, where c is a constant, then Example 4.13
demonstrates that A4 can defeat πbeacon. Overall, it may indeed be true that an adversary with
up to ≈ 2/3 of the mining power is still weak enough in a practical setting (cf. Section 4.1), but
such an adversary is likely to be too powerful when πbeacon is invoked with a sufficiently large n.
As a side note, let us remark that a similar reasoning to the above shows that an adversary
A5 who operates in the Bitcoin backbone model with an infinite budget and more than 1/2 of the
mining power can bias the output bit by the largest possible amount (i.e., a larger bias than that
of the adversary in Section 3). The adversary A5 can create her own private chain that has at
least n+k blocks and is longer than the chains that the honest parties have, and publish it only
in case it derives the desired output bit for the beacon. This event happens with probability
1/2, because A5 succeeds to create the longest chain with probability 1. Otherwise, A5 discards
her chain, and proceeds to create a fresh longest chain that starts from where the discarded
chain started. Even though it should take A5 much longer to create the second chain, she still
succeeds with probability 1, and therefore succeeds to obtain the desired beacon output with
probability 1/2. Otherwise, she discards her chain again, and repeats the process. Hence, overall,
A5 succeeds to set the beacon to the output that she desires with probability 12+ 14+ 18+ . . . = 1.
While Lemma 4.7 and Interpretation 4.12 establish that πbeacon is secure against any adver-
sarial strategy, it can be useful to consider practical strategies that an adversary may use. In
a usual setting, selfish mining strategies [25, 4, 48] may become profitable only after at least
one difficulty readjustment occurs (in Bitcoin this happens after a 2016 blocks window that
takes ≈ 2 weeks). This is because a selfish miner would have had less orphaned blocks if she
dedicated her entire mining power to generating blocks at the head of the honest chain. How-
ever, when the goal of the adversary is to influence the beacon rather than to earn revenues,
a selfish mining strategy can be effective even before a difficulty readjustment occurs, because
the proportional amount of blocks that the adversary contributes relative to the honest miners
will already be larger. That being said, our utilization of the extraordinary adversary that is
described in Remark 4.11 was only for the purpose of the analysis, and in reality an adversary
with less than 1/2 of the mining power cannot sustain a private chain for long. Thus, when
considering an adversary with β mining power and γ = λ(1 + δ)β, λ ≥ 1 as in Lemma 4.7, it is
unlikely that this adversary can create 1/λ portion of the blocks. To give a concrete example,
the basic selfish mining strategy of [25] implies that an adversary with 1/3 of the mining power
and no connectivity advantage can create 38.4% of the blocks.
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4.1 Discussion of mining profitability
Since the market entry costs for Bitcoin mining are low, the expected profit margin cannot
be high. The reason for this is that if anyone could purchase a Bitcoin mining machine that
creates money ad infinitum, then everyone would become a Bitcoin miner. Actually, it is also
unreasonable to assume that Bitcoin mining is necessarily risk-free, as in reality it is in fact
unprofitable to be a Bitcoin miner sometimes (see [51, 21, 38, 42, 26] for some analysis and
examples).
Hence, an unexcessive growth rate for maxprofits(t, n) that satisfies ∀n : maxprofits(t, n) ≤ 2t
is more than reasonable, as most miners would be quite happy to double the return on their
investment. Of course, our analysis can also accommodate a more lucrative bound, for example
∀n : maxprofits(t, n) ≤ 100t. In fact, Interpretation 4.12 shows that our analysis holds for
maxprofits(t, n) = o(
√
n), though it is more natural to assume that the profits bound is a
function of t.
The economic reasoning can also be elaborated upon as follows. Suppose that Alice buy a
citrus juicer and starts a lemonade stand. The price at which Alice buys lemons is lower than
the price at which she sells the lemonade, hence Alice makes a profit with each sale. While
Alice’s initial investment in the citrus juicer enables her to continuously accumulate profits, we
do not expect Alice to become a billionaire as a result of this process. Our pessimistic prediction
stems from the observations that the citrus juicer erodes over time, that Alice’s profit margin
is unlikely to be excessive, and that Alice’s wealth will be measured relative to her competitors
rather than in absolute terms. If Alice decides to drop the lemonade business and become a
Bitcoin miner instead, the same reasoning still applies.
Hence, even if a Bitcoin miner re-invests some of her profits by buying additional mining
equipment, we can expect this process to converge towards some bound on the overall amount
of profits. While Lemma 4.7 assumes that the adversary’s mining power β is constant, we can
instead interpret β as the maximal mining power that the adversary can obtain as a result of
the re-investments process.
To take some exemplary figures, a miner may have an average cost of at least 98 coins
in terms of power consumption mining equipment erosion until she succeeds to solve a block,
and the reward that she earns from each solved block is 100 coins on average. If we examine
Lemma 4.3, we see that for increasingly greater values of n it is indeed the case that d can be
larger while still satisfying the inequality δ 1p′ ℓ ≤ n − d. However, the gains that the adversary
achieves with a large d can be disregarded due to Assumption 4.1. This can be thought of as
quite reasonable since the profit margin is modest (100 − 98 = 2 or less coins profit per solved
block), as opposed to mining at a loss by discarding half of the solved blocks, which will lead
to a quick deterioration of funds (a loss of 50 − 98 = −48 coins per solved block). This can
be taken to mean that the adversary does not earn a substantial enough amount of coins by
including many “detrimental” blocks before the n blocks that the beacon utilizes are created.
Thus, in a practical setting, it is likely that the adversary A2 of Interpretation 4.10 is already
as powerful as the general adversary A3 of Interpretation 4.12.
Let us provide a counterexample that shows that an unreasonable profits structure implies
that the adversary is powerful enough to defeat any beacon protocol.
Example 4.13. Consider an unrealistic setting where the adversary’s profit margin per block
is constant during any arbitrarily long period of time. Hence, in particular, a condition of the
form ∃c ∀n : maxprofits(t, n) ≤ c · t does not hold. In this setting, it is impossible to have a
beacon that outputs a bit whose statistical distance from uniform is arbitrarily close to 0, even
in the forkless modelMFL, and even if the adversary has a finite budget that prevents her from
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operating at a loss indefinitely. To see this, suppose for example that the reward per block is
x = 60 coins, the adversary has p = 1/10 of the mining power, and attempting to produce each
block costs the adversary yp = 5 coins. Thus, the profit margin is zp = 60 · 1/10 − 5 = 1 coin
per block. On the other hand, operating at a loss by discarding all “detrimental” blocks implies
that the adversary has a cost of wp = 60 · 1/19−5 > 60 · 1/20−5 = −2 coins per block on average.
Therefore, one straightforward strategy for the adversary in this case is to operate honestly
during the first n/2 blocks, and discard all of her “detrimental” blocks in the next n/4 blocks.
Since w > −2z, w.h.p. the adversary will earn enough coins during the first n/2 blocks so that
she would not run out of funds while operating at a loss in the following n/4 blocks. The beacon
protocol should thus be secure against a non-oblivious symbol-fixing source that controls ≈ n/40
of the locations. However, our lower bound in Section 3 shows that an adversary who controls
a constant fraction p̂ = 1/40 of the locations can bias the output bit of the beacon by at least an
1/6 · p̂ = 1/240 amount.
In fact, the above example implies that any constant production cost yp and positive profit
margin zp make it impossible to achieve an arbitrarily small bias. In the real world it may be
possible to have an investment that generates constant profits in nominal terms, though one
should factor inflation-adjusted prices in that case.
5 Hybrid protocol
We now consider a protocol that combines reliance on designated parties and randomness ex-
traction from the Bitcoin public ledger. In this setting, the designated parties are hopefully
reputable and honest, and thus the goal is to have a protocol that makes use of the designated
parties in order to output a bit that has even less bias when compared to the πbeacon protocol.
An ideal objective for a hybrid protocol is of the following form:
• If the number of designated parties who are honest is above some threshold, then the
output bit has less bias than that of πbeacon.
• Otherwise, the bias of the output bit is not worse than that of πbeacon.
Unfortunately, this objective is bound to fail, barring additional assumptions. To see that,
consider for example an adversary who corrupts all of the designated parties. If this adversary
has β mining power, then she should get some advantage relative to an adversary with β mining
power who tries to defeat πbeacon, because the hybrid protocol takes into account the actions of
the designated parties. Thus, we present a protocol that does not necessarily accomplish the
ideal goal.
In a similar fashion to other blockchain-based protocols that impose fairness [3, 12, 36, 34, 35],
our hybrid protocol makes use of a commitment with penalty functionality F⋆com. The F⋆com
functionality allows a party Pi to lock q coins of hers, so that she can take back possession of
these q coins if and only if she reveals a certain decommitment before a time limit τ . In case
the limit τ passed and Pi did not reveal the decommitment, the q coins are destroyed. Due to
the OP CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY [49] softfork, the F⋆com functionality can be realized in Bitcoin in
a straightforward manner. See Code 1 for a high-level pseudocode of F⋆com, and Code 2 for the
actual Bitcoin script that corresponds to it.
The hybrid protocol is presented in Figure 3. The index u1 specifies an agreed upon starting
block Bu1 . As we discuss below, a sensible choice for the function f can be f(x1, x2, . . . , xm) =
majority(x1, x2, . . . , xm) or f(x1, x2, . . . , xm) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xm. The parameter t specifies a
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Code 1 Pseudocode of CLTV-based F⋆com
1: if block# > τ then
2: return False ⊲ the q coins are unspendable
3: else
4: Pi can spend the q coins by
5: signing with ski ⊲ the public key pki of Pi is hardcoded
6: and
7: supplying w such that hash(w) = ci ⊲ the commitment ci is hardcoded
8: end if
Code 2 Bitcoin script of CLTV-based F⋆com
<τ> CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY IF HASH256 <ci> EQUALVERIFY <pki> CHECKSIGVERIFY ENDIF
segment length in which each designated party Pi ∈ {P1, P2, . . . , Pm} is required to react, as
otherwise Pi is regarded as a corrupt party who aborted. The purpose of the parameter k is
to handle the possible re-organizations of the chain history by ensuring w.h.p. an agreement
on a common prefix among the honest miners, in the beacon phase as well as in the commit-
ments/decommitments phases.
Let us examine the case of r = 1 and f(x1, x2, . . . , xm) = majority(x1, x2, . . . , xm) first.
Suppose for the moment that the adversary Ahyb does not possess any mining power. Suppose
that m is odd, and denote h , m+12 . In case Ahyb corrupts a minimal majority of the parties,
say P1, P2, . . . , Ph, she can choose d1 = d2 = · · · = dh = 1 in the commitments phase. Then,
Ahyb will inspect the bit b that was derived in beacon phase, and will either decommit all of
the bits d1, d2, . . . , dh so that the output will be b⊕ 1, or withhold h′ of the h bits to cause the
output to be b at the cost of losing h′ · q coins. We thus see that when Ahyb corrupts a majority
of the designated parties, she has complete control over the output. Note that 1 ≤ h′ ≤ h, with
h′ = 1 in the case that all of the m− h honest parties committed to 0, and h′ = h in the case
that all of the m−h honest parties committed to 1. Since the probability that Ahyb would wish
to flip b is 1/2, it follows that Ahyb has to pay a penalty of more than 12q coins in expectation.
By contrast, consider a protocol that consists of only the first and third phases, i.e., without
employing the beacon as the intermediate phase. An adversary who corrupts the majority of
the designated parties has complete control over the output, without paying any penalty. This
is because the adversary can simply commit to the output bit that she desires.
The above observations imply that when Ahyb corrupts at least one (and at most h) of the
designated parties, she can then either
• Expend resources during the beacon phase in an attempt to influence b to be the opposite
of her desired output, thus making it less likely that she will need to withhold some of her
decommitments and lose q or more coins.
• Or, remain idle during the beacon phase, and lose at least q coins in case she wishes to
flip b during the decommitments phase.
By assuming that Ahyb corrupts a minority of the designated parties, we can make the
following claim.
Claim 5.1. Suppose that πhyb is parameterized according to r = 1 and f(x1, x2, . . . , xm) =
majority(x1, x2, . . . , xm). Suppose that the adversary Ahyb purchased her mining power with R1
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Protocol πhyb
• For each round j ∈ [r]:
– Denote u′j , uj + t+ k, u
′′
j , u
′
j + n+ k.
– Commitments phase. Before the block Buj is extended by t extra blocks:
∗ For each i ∈ [m]: Pi picks a uniform random bit di, and invokes F⋆com to broadcast
a transaction that locks q coins of hers, specifies a commitment ci = com(di), and
specifies u′′j as the limit.
– Beacon phase.
∗ Invoke πbeacon by waiting for Bu′
j
to be extended by n + k new blocks
Bu′
j
+1, Bu′
j
+2, . . . , Bu′′
j
, thus deriving a bit b from Bu′
j
+1, Bu′
j
+2, . . . , Bu′
j
+n.
– Decommitments phase.
∗ For each i ∈ [m]: Pi reclaims her q coins by posting the decommitment di in any of
the blocks Bu′′
j
+1, Bu′′
j
+2 . . . , Bu′′
j
+t.
∗ Wait until the blockchain reaches block Bu′′
j
+t+k.
∗ For each i ∈ [m]:
⋆ If Pi did not forfeit prior to round j, and posted her decommitment di until the
block Bu′′
j
+t, then d
′
i = di.
⋆ Otherwise, Pi forfeits and d
′
i = 0.
∗ Set sj = b⊕ f(d′1, d′2, . . . , d′m), and set uj+1 = u′′j + 1.
• Output the bit majority(s1, s2, . . . , sr).
Figure 3: The Hybrid beacon protocol (think r = 1, f = majority).
coins, and has an additional reserve of R2 coins. Assume that the following conditions hold:
1. R2 +maxprofits(R1, n+ 2t+ 3k) < q.
2. Ahyb does not go under budget.
3. Ahyb corrupts m′ < m2 of the designated parties.
Then, the output of πhyb is less biased than the output of πbeacon.
Proof. The first condition implies that Ahyb does not have enough funds to withhold any decom-
mitment, unless she goes under budget. Therefore, the second condition implies that Ahyb can
influence the output only during the beacon phase. However, the third condition implies that
Ahyb will have an uncertainty regarding the direction in which to influence the beacon, because
the output may or may not become flipped when the other m − m′ designated parties reveal
their input bits in the decommitments phase.
Let us now consider r = 1 and f(x1, x2, . . . , xm) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xm. If at least one of
the designated parties is honest, then it is useless for Ahyb to try to influence the beacon phase,
and instead she must lose the q coins penalty if she wishes to influence the output bit. Thus,
Ahyb may be a more powerful adversary in the case of f = majority, as then the mining power
of Ahyb can be effective even if she does not corrupt all of the designated parties. On the other
hand, when f = majority and Ahyb corrupts only one designated party, she may fail to influence
the output if she withholds the decommitment. Hence, f = majority and f = xor are a priori
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incomparable. Under the reasonable assumption that the cost of influencing the beacon is high,
it should be better to use f = majority in order to make it difficult for Ahyb to influence f . In
the case that the cost of influencing the beacon is low, it might be better to use f = xor in order
to make it less likely that the distribution of the output bit is affected by the beacon phase (this
can happen only if Ahyb corrupts all the designated parties).
Let us also consider the case of incorporating more rounds in πhyb.
Claim 5.2. Suppose that πhyb is parameterized according to an odd r > 1 and f(x1, x2, . . . , xm) =
x1⊕x2⊕ · · · ⊕ xm. Suppose that the adversary Ahyb purchased her mining power with R1 coins,
and has an additional reserve of R2 coins. Let ǫ > 0 be arbitrary. Denote ℓ , ⌊2ǫπe
√
r −√r⌋−1.
Assume that the following conditions hold:
1. R2 +maxprofits(R1, r(n+ 2t+ 3k)) ≤ ℓq.
2. Ahyb does not go under budget.
3. Ahyb corrupts m′ ≤ m− 1 of the designated parties.
Then, the protocol πhyb outputs a bit whose statistical distance from a uniform random bit is at
most ǫ.
Proof. The third condition implies that Ahyb must lose q coins for every round that she wishes
to control. Hence, the first and second conditions imply that Ahyb would not have enough
funds to control more than ℓ rounds by the time that the protocol terminated. We can thus
regard Ahyb as having ℓ′ ≤ ℓ locations that she controls, and the remaining r − ℓ′ locations
are uniform random. While the majority extractor is an ǫ-extractor for (r, r − ℓ) non-oblivious
bit-fixing source, an inspection of Lemma 2.3 shows that the same holds even in the case of a
somewhat more powerful adversary. This adversary is a a quota of ℓ locations, and upon seeing
the inputs x1, x2, . . . , xi−1 the adversary is allowed to decide whether to take control over xi by
decrementing her quota, or let xi be sampled as a uniform random bit. The relevant observation
is that the event E in Lemma 2.3 has the same meaning both in the case of an adversary that
plays at ℓ locations that are fixed in advance, and an adversary who chooses adaptively the
location in which she plays. It therefore follows that the statistical distance between the output
bit and a uniform random bit is ǫ or less.
As discussed above, the only reason for employing the beacon when πhyb is parameterized
according to f(x1, x2, . . . , xm) = x1⊕x2⊕· · ·⊕xm is to handle the possibility that the adversary
Ahyb corrupts all the designated parties.
Let us note that under the assumption that Ahyb is able to corrupt significantly less than
half of the designated parties, the hybrid protocol πhyb can be improved by replacing f with
the iterated majority extractor [9, 33]. Specifically, when the number of non-random inputs is
≈ m0.63 or less, the iterated majority extractor is strictly better than the majority extractor. For
example, ifAhyb corrupts one ofm = 9 designated parties, she will have (84)/28 = 0.273 probability
to withhold and flip the beacon bit in the case of the majority extractor, and 1/2 · 1/2 = 0.25
probability in the case of the iterated majority extractor (cf. [11, Figure 1]).
In comparison to πbeacon, a disadvantage of πhyb is that the public verifiability aspect is
diminished. That is, even if all the designated parties decommitted, it cannot be verified whether
they would have also decommitted (as opposed to taking a loss of at least q coins) in case the
output of the beacon phase was b⊕ 1 instead of b.
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6 Practical considerations
For a beacon protocol that is dependent upon Bitcoin or similar systems, the real-world aspects
of proof of work (PoW) based cryptocurrencies present some additional security concerns, as
well as certain beneficial factors.
First, let us consider the additional potential risks. Our analysis assumed an adversary with
β mining power, such that the performance of the πbeacon protocol is better when β is smaller.
However, in the real world, Bitcoin miners delegate their power to centralized pools. We can thus
regard the pool administrator as the adversary, as is it abnormal for a single pool to hold more
than 12 of the mining power. Moreover, the risk that an adversarial pool administrator (with a
large β) poses is less profound than what one may think. The reason for that is that the pool
administrator can influence πbeacon only by discarding “detrimental” blocks (cf. Definition 4.2)
that are solved by the miners who delegate their power to the pool. When the miners who
participate in the pool would notice that their solved blocks are not being used and thus the
rewards are not being added to the pool’s reserve, they are likely to switch to a competing pool.
On the other hand, the real-world behavior of the miners of crytocurrencies provides oppor-
tunities to strengthen the security of a beacon protocol. Since there are multiple cryptocurrency
systems that enjoy some level of popularity, and these systems are based on different PoW hash
functions, the beacon protocol can amplify its security by relying on multiple blockchains. The
benefit in this stems from the observation that an adversary A who wishes to influence the
beacon output would need invest in different kinds of mining equipment (or bribe the miners of
different systems). That is, the amount of popularity that various cryptocurrency systems have
can be harnessed to increase the overall security level of the beacon protocol. For example, let
us make the following suppositions with regard to Bitcoin and Litecoin [37]:
1. Both Bitcoin and Litecoin have a similar market entry cost, implying that the profit margin
for either of them is low.
2. The purchasing power of the Bitcoin currency is c1 times greater than that of the Litecoin
currency, where c1 ≥ 1 because Bitcoin enjoys a greater level of adoption among the
population.
3. The level of PoW based security that Bitcoin has is c2 times greater than that of Litecoin,
where c2 ≥ 1 because Bitcoin is more popular and thus more miners have a vested interest
to keep it secure.
Notice that if A needs to invest t coins to acquire p < 1 of the Bitcoin mining power, then the
third supposition implies that A obtains ≈ c2 · p of the Litecoin mining power by investing t
coins into Litecoin mining equipment. Also note that c1 6= c2 is possible at least over the short
term, though it is reasonable to assume that the adoption level would drive the security level
over the long term. To estimate c2, one should compare the cost (and availability) of mining
equipment to the current PoW difficulty target of the Bitcoin and Litecoin networks.
Consider a protocol that uses majority(B1, B2, . . . , Bm, B
′
1, B
′
2, . . . , B
′
w) to derives the output
bit of the beacon, where B1, . . . , Bm are Bitcoin blocks, B
′
1, . . . , B
′
w are Litecoin blocks, and the
timestamps of B1 and B
′
1 are approximately the same. What would be a good choice for the
parameter w?
Let x denote the value of each Bitcoin block reward. Due to our second supposition, the
value of each Litecoin block reward is x/c1. The adversary A is expected to solve p ·m Bitcoin
blocks, and thus lose ≈ x· pm2 in value as she tries to influence the output bit. Also, A is expected
to solve c2 · p ·w Litecoin blocks, and thus lose ≈ xc1 ·
c2pw
2 in value. Given our first supposition,
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let us simplify further by assuming that the potential revenues that A can earn while creating
blocks either among B1, . . . , Bm or among B
′
1, . . . , B
′
w are relatively insignificant. Therefore, in
the case that A invested the same amount into Bitcoin mining equipment and Litecoin mining
equipment, w = c1c2m implies that it is about as costly for A to influence the Bitcoin portion and
the Litecoin portion of the inputs to the majority function. E.g., if the price of Litecoin is 100
times smaller than that of Bitcoin, and the security of the Litecoin network is 50 times smaller
than that of Bitcoin, then w = 2m is a rational choice.
The running time of this protocol is comparable to πbeacon with n = m + w/4, because the
blocks interval of Litecoin blocks is 4 times shorter than that of Bitcoin. Hence, the advantage
of this beacon protocol over πbeacon is that A invested 2t coins to try to influence the m + w
blocks, while she would have needed to invest only t coins to try to influence m + w/4 Bitcoin
blocks. Furthermore, the need to acquire different kinds of mining equipment (SHA256 ASIC for
Bitcoin and scrypt ASIC for Litecoin) makes the task of the adversary more demanding.
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